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CHAPTER3 
"Putting on the Neighbor" 
The Ciceronian Impulse in Luther's Christian 
Approach to Practical Reason 
Gary M. Simpson 
Everyone sho11!d "p11t 011" his neighbor and so cond11ct himself to1vard him 
as if he himself n;ere in the other's place. 1 
Cicem J1Jas the 1vz'sest man. 2 
What has long been noticed but little analyzed is Luther's relationship with his 
"beloved Cicero," as one interpreter has again recently remarked.3 I will explore a 
key feah1re of Cicero's relationship with his philosophical predecessors in order 
to highlight one reason for Luther's love affair with this "wisest man." The 
twinkle in Luther's eye makes good sense when we consider Cicero's peculiar 
wisdom within the context of Luther's christological formulation of Christian 
love as "putting on" one's neighbor. In particular, Cicero's innovation in the 
Greek rhetorical tradition provided Luther with a kind of philosophical venture 
capital for his christologically tinged approach to practical reason. 
Faith and Practical Reason 
Luther's "The Preedom of a Christian" remains a mother lode for the intricate 
and richly textured relationships of faith, love, and practical reason, which were 
much contested in Luther's day and before, as in our own:1 Indeed, in the very 
last paragraph he summarizes the predicament that confronts practical reason5 or 
"natural reason," as he calls it there.6 \'{/hen the ubiquitous questions of our moral 
life arise, practical reason becomes "superstitious." That is, practical reason erro-
neously presumes the quite commonly held "opinion," which moreover is 
"trained and confirmed ... by the practice of all earthly lawgivers," that its calling 
is to lead us toward righteousness in God's sight, toward justification.7 Luther 
sought to emancipate practical reason from such "false opinions concerning 
works, that is, from the foolish presumption that justification is acquired by 
works"8 by having us "theodidacti, that is, those taught by God Uohn 6:45]."9 
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In Luther's Lect11res 011 Ga/atit111s (1531, 1536), he promulgates the first com-
mandment of his theology, so to speak: ne co1!fi111dt1l11r mores etfides ("let not moral-
ity and faith be confounded")-"both are necessary, but both must be kept 
within their limits." As he notes in a 1522 sermon: 
[I]t is necessary to make a distinction between God and 
men, between spiritual and temporal things. In human af-
fairs man's judgment suffices. For these things, he needs no 
light but that of reason .... 13ut in divine things, the things 
concerning God, and in which we must conduct ourselves 
acceptably with him and must secure [eternal! happiness for 
ourselves, human nature is absolutely blind, staring stonc-
blind, unable to recognize in the slightest degree what these 
things are. 10 
Luther emphasizes that this distinction between the passive righteousness of 
faith and the active righteousness of love and reason is "easy to speak of," but "in 
experience and practice it is the most difficult of all, even if you exercise and 
practice it diligently." 11 \X/hen reason trespasses its terrestrial limits, aspiring to 
occupy the throne in matters of salvation, Luther's rhetoric is unsparing. Reason, 
so enthroned, transmogrifies into "the lovely whore," the "arch-prostitute," "the 
Devil's whore," and the "Devil's bridc." 12 For this reason, exclaims Luther 
in his "Disputation against Scholastic Theology," "Virtually the entire [Ni-
comachecm] Ethics of Aristotle is the worst enemy of grace. This in opposition 
to the scholastics." 13 
As we will see, a Ciceronian form of practical reason, when-like love-
formed by faith in Christ, can render a salutary service to the Christian love of 
neighbor. 14 Practical reason, when formed by faith, shares characteristics akin to 
Luther's famous "reason illumined by faith" that grasps the beauty and joy of that 
"fortunate exchange,"15 which "couples Christ and me more intimately than a 
husband is coupled to his wifc." 16 Herc we encounter forms of "another reason," 
of an emancipated reason that Luther calls "the reason of faith." 17 The purpose, 
therefore, of the Christian vocation to rightly distinguish faith and reason in ex-
perience and practice is so that in everyday life they might be rightly related and 
coordinated. Cicero's oratorical model of practical reason made it a ready candi-
date for such coordination. Before turning to it we will attend briefly to Luther's 
cruciform communion Christology and its ramifications for the relationship of 
faith and good works of neighbor love. 
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"Putting On" the Neighbor 
Luther sought to reestablish the relationship between faith and love and thus to 
undo the distorted relationship that had come to dominate medieval piety ex-
pressed theologically in Aquinas's formula, "faith formed by love." Luther 
claimed, to put it briefly, that Christian living is doubly ecstatic. Christians live 
"beyond" themselves in a twofold way: "a Christian lives not in himself, but in 
Christ and in his neighbor .... He lives in Christ through faith, in his neighbor 
through love." 18 Faith, whose form is Christ himself, 19 is our all-sufficient 
sociality in relationship with God, and love is our all-sufficient sociality in rela-
tionship with neighbors. 20 Indeed, it is the sufficiency of faith in Christ, this "liv-
ing 'spring of water welling up to eternal life' Uohn 4:14],"21 that begets love's 
sufficiency in relationship with neighbors. Because "every good tree produces 
good fruit" [Matt. 7:17],22 therefore, "[!Jove is true and genuine where there 
is true and genuine faith." 23 
Christian love entails that "the good things we have from God should flow 
from one to the other and be common to all."2·1 In this earthly commonwealth 
formed by love, the explicit focus lies on "what I see is necessary, profitable, and 
salutary to my neighbor."25 While love, overflowing from faith, provides the will-
ing spontaneity to meet the neighbors' and their neighborhoods' needs, it does 
not yet by itself provide the moral epistemology, so to speak, for how one dis-
cerns these needs and what will meet them. Historically, such discernment is the 
calling, service, and capacities that practical reason provides for love, provisions 
of which Luther is quite aware.26 
Luther employs the oft-used biblical, and Pauline, metaphor of "put on," as 
with clothing, relative to our neighbors. Indeed, we "put on" Christ (Rom. 13:14) 
in our baptisms (Gal. 3:27) because in Luther's cruciform sociality Christ has "so 
'put on' us and acted for us as if he had been what we are,"27 that is, sufferers and 
sinners.28 More so yet, Christ's putting on sufferers and sinners furnishes both 
the possibility and the form of a Christian's putting on one's neighbor "as if he 
himself were in the other's place."29 We become "Christ to my neighbor," "Christ 
to the other," "Christs to one another"30 by putting on their life-world, sharing 
their place, attending to their needs from within their situation. Here Luther's 
exploration of cruciform communion Christology emits a moral epistemological 
imagination, so to speak, for practical reason. 
The Love Affair with Cicero 
Luther had high regard for "worldly wisdom" relative to the moral life. 31 God 
"writes it [God's moral wisdom and law] upon the hearts of all human beings 
... [and] from this natural knowledge have originated all the books of the 
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more sensible philosophers, such as Aesop, Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, 
Cicero, and C:ato."32 Indeed, God 
is a gentle and wealthy Lord. Ile casts much gold, silver, wealth, 
dominions, and kingdoms among the godless, as though it were 
chaff or sand. Thus he casts great intelligence, wisdom, lan-
guages, and oratorical ability among them, too, so that His dear 
Christians look like mere children, fools, and beggars by compar-
ison.33 
In his L~ct11res 011 Genesis, Luther also reveals his own preference for worldly 
wisdom: "Let the older ones learn Cicero, to whom, to my surprise, some prefer 
Aristotle as a teacher of morals."31 Already in his first appointment at the Uniyer-
sity of Wittenberg (October, 1508-March, 1509) he had lectured four hours a day 
on Aristotle's Nico111ac/Jea11 Et/Jics for a course on moral theology. He always held 
Book 5-justicc and epieikeia-and Book 6-prudcncc-of Nico111ac/Jea11 Ethics in 
high regard, but he still considered Cicero "supreme in human wisdom." 35 "Aris-
totle's [Nico111ac/Jea11] Et/Jics is fair," he confessed, "but Cicero's q/}ices I 011 D11ties] is 
better."36 It is no accident, then, that even in his last preserved written words 
Luther cites Cicero.37 Herc we will examine one aspect of Cicero's work-there 
arc others-that endeared him to Luther: oratory and civic life. 
Oratory and Civic Life 
The first Ciceronian impulse for Luther's approach to practical reason resides in 
the civic vocation of Cicero's innovative understanding of rhetoric. Here we will 
probe three facets of Ciceronian rhetoric that arc crucial (there arc others): the 
bond of wisdom and ekKJUcncc, the vocation of oratory in civic life, and the rela-
tionship between oratory and consent. Cicero took on the dispute between Plato 
and the sophists who both, though from opposite points of view, held to the 
incompatibility of philosophy, reason, and wisdom, on the one hand, and rheto-
ric, on the other. Prom his earliest reflections as a twenty-year-old or so to his last 
book written in the year that he died, Cicero sought to heal the breach inherited 
from the Greeks between philosophy and rhetoric, between reason and speech, 
between wisdom and eloquence. This was an artificial, indeed illusory breach, he 
argued, that undermined his own lifelong aspirations for a republican basis of 
society. "Wisdom witl1out eloquence leads to very little of value for civic bodies, 
while eloquence without wisdom for the most part performs in an excessive fashion 
and leads to nothing," he claims in 011 [111•e11tirm. 38 In 011 /)11/ies he argues: 
"PU1TING ON Tf!E NEIGI IBOR" 35 
13ut it seems we must trace back to their ultimate sources the 
principles of fellowship and society that Nature has established 
among men. The first principle is that which is found in the 
connection subsisting between all the members of the human 
race; and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which 
by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, 
discussing, and reasoning associate men together and unite them 
in a sort of natural fraternity. In no other particular are we far-
ther removed from the nature of beasts. 39 
Cicero was "the wisest man" precisely because, as Luther himself empha-
sized in 1532, he combined "wisdom and eloquence."•to Luther was keen on this 
Ciceronian innovation to bring about not only a measure of "natural fraternity," 
which is the task of practical reason, but also to bolster Luther's waning though 
still hopeful yearnings for reform of the church. Por instance, in his introductory 
remarks to Erasmus in Tbe llondage qft/Je 11:711! (1525) he goes so far as to employ 
the Ciceronian innovation. Luther would bring his gift of wisdom to the debate 
and bear Erasmus's "ignorance," and he pleaded that Erasmus would bear Lu-
ther's "lack of eloquence" by bringing his gift of it, in order "to render mutual 
service with our gifts, so that each with his own gift bears the burden and need of 
the other [Gal. 6:2]."•ll During the weeks leading up to the Diet of Augsburg 
(1530), Luther urged political authorities to excel in the virtue of peacemaking 
with its benefits "so eloquent and so wise."42 On another, very different occasion, 
Luther, directly inspired by Cicero, raved that we come to trust Jesus because he 
alone is "the wisest among the sons of men" endowed with "the sweetest and 
loveliest lips," with "the loveliest mouth," "pleasant lips," indeed "superabundant 
in His lips" out of which "gushes forth ... the sweetest and loveliest wisdom ... 
sweet and delightful wisdom, worthy of such high praise."43 
Luther's initial affection for Cicero commenced because of the "bond" that 
Cicero had forged between wisdom and eloquence. Luther's love intensified be-
cause Cicero understood oratory itself to be nothing less than wisdom and elo-
quence brought to bear on civic life for its well-being, and, from Luther's 
theological perspective as well, brought to bear on ecclesial life for its commun-
ion and salvation. Indeed, Cicero had argued that it was oratory itself that origi-
nally actualized human sociality and furthermore that it is only continual oratory 
that can sustain and strengthen civic life in its various dimensions. In this way 
oratory is itself the key mode of practical reason. The implications of Cicero's 
argument for Luther and his times were enormous and are routinely underesti-
mated or even overlooked altogether. 
Briefly stated, nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians of political phi-
losophy have generally juxtaposed two dichotomous medieval and Reformation 
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lines of thought relative to human sociality, and theologians have usually followed 
this consensus. Augustine set forth the first line of thought, epitomized in his 
well-known statement: "Por there is nothing so social by nature, so anti-social by 
sin, as man."·11 \Vithin the earthly city, humanity's fallen, perverted, sinful nature 
made anything but discord and strife hardly imaginable yet alone achievable. At 
best God instituted political authority as a negative counterforce to our fallen 
nature, with the task to bridle human corruption and to compel obedience to its 
order of coerced tram1uility. Human sociality hardly crosses the threshold into the 
postlapsarian era, perhaps not at all. Aristotle fathered the second line of thought, 
according to this historical reconstruction, which Thomas Aquinas and his fol-
lowers supposedly adopted wholeheartedly. Nature constitutes human beings as 
political animals and endows us with an internal telos whereby our natural inclina-
tions and tendencies organically, directly, and inexorably lead to positive family, 
civic, and political structures and institutions. Robust notions of sin, or its philo-
sophical equivalents, do not figure prominently in Aristotle's equation, save per-
haps in a weak privational fashion:15 Political historians, and theologians as well, 
have routinely placed Luther prominently and exclusively within the Augustinian 
line of "pure pcssimism."·16 
Cicero, however, represents a third, clearly distinguishable, and readily avail-
able tradition from which Luther himself drcw:17 In Cicero's account of the ori-
gins of human sociality, Nature originally endowed humans with the potentiality 
for sociability residing in their capacities for reason and speech. This potentiality, 
however, stayed dormant, leaving human primordial existence scattered, savage, 
brutish, and devoid of morality, law, and civic associations. \Vhat humans needed 
and what emerged was a first orator who "transformed them [primordial humans] 
from wild beasts and savages into tame and gentle creatures on account of heed-
ing speech and reason more diligcntly."·1~ Furthcrmon.:, for Cicero, oratory's civic 
vocation must continue lest humans relapse to their primordial antisocial exist-
ence. Por Luther and many others, this vision of sinful yet social contributed to 
his twofold realism about both human sin and God's continuing left-hand provi-
dence. The Ciceronian impulse continually nudged Luther away from the "pure 
pessimism" that he surely at times exhibited. Luther, therefore, regularly cited 
Psalm 127:1, which was also on his short list of verses that children should mem-
orize,49 when espousing God's real providence mediated through a variety of 
terrestrial "masks." Unsurprisingly, Luther at times interpreted these masks from 
the viewpoint of oratory. 50 
Especially in 011 the Best Sort ef Oratory and 011 D11ties, Cicero construed and 
exercised practical reason through his oratorical imagination. Herc Cicero empha-
sized a third characteristic that kindled Luther's affection: the consent of the ora-
tor's audience. In the task of practical reason "[t]hc supreme orator is the one 
whose speech instructs, delights, and moves the minds of his audience ... To 
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move them is indispensible."51 The orator must therefore accommodate oneself 
to common idioms, customs, and speech. As Cary Nederman stresses, "whereas 
in all other arts that which is most excellent is furthest removed from the under-
standing and mental capacity of the untutored, in oratory the very cardinal sin is 
to depart from the language of everyday life and the usage approved by the sense 
of the community."52 We can see this very dynamic at work in Luther's "On 
Translating," whereby the biblical translator must diligently "look the other in the 
mouth."53 This priority on the audience resonates both with Luther's "new radi-
cal reevaluation of ordinary life"54 and with his christological accent to "'put on' 
his neighbor and so conduct himself toward him as if he himself were in the 
other's place." 
Cicero's oratorical, discursive, communicative imagination of practical reason 
is "overtly participatory" where the audience of fellow citizens is the final arbiter. 
The orator thereby defers to the audience rather than commands them.55 Accord-
ing to Luther's christological imagination of Christian love, we "put on" our 
neighbors' circumstances and needs, and these then direct, discipline, and deter-
mine the situation-specific shape of Christian love. Luther usually reserved his 
more overt participatory intuitions and insights more for his conciliar approach 
to ecclesial life56 than for his political approach to terrestrial rule. However, when 
he reflected on the moral aptitudes of rulers regarding distributive justice, he 
often played a participatory note. 
Luther developed a suggestion first made by Augustine that Paul positioned 
love as the first fruit of the Spirit because love is really the only Christian virtue 
(Gal. 5:6; also Rom. 5:5; l Corinthians 13). As we "put on" our neighbors, Chris-
tian love "expands into all the fruit of the Spirit."57 Whether the neighbor is with-
in or without the Christian communion appears unimportant (Gal. 5:13-14; Rom. 
13:8-10). Christian love operates like a pluripotent stem cell becoming-by 
means of an emancipated practical reason-whatever set of virtues neighbors, 
neighborhoods, and communities need for their welfare, thus setting out the 
breadth of Christian vocation in God's world. 
Conclusion 
Luther was surely not the only one of his age to be delighted, instructed, and 
moved deeply by this "wisest man." In this brief exploration we can more easily 
determine the extent and depth of Luther's delight and affectedness than we can 
the precise nature of the instruction that he took from Cicero. Various models of 
practical reason were commonplace in Medieval and Renaissance thinkers and 
numerous were delighted, instructed, and moved by Cicero. 
I have suggested a Ciceronian impulse within Luther's approach to practical 
reason, though he never wrote a philosophical account on the subject matter. 
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Luther's metaphor of Christian love as "putting on" one's neighbors readily 
opens a door for and resonates with Cicero's participatory oratorical model of 
practical reason. The Ciceronian impulse also sheds light on his fnx1uent lyrical 
raptures in favor of Aristotle's concept of epieikeia-the practical spirit of justice 
in complexities of real life-rather than Plato's prcfcn:nce for the pure letter of 
the law. Here, too, Luther regularly cites Cicero's commonplace, "More law, less 
justice [more injury]" ("S111111m1111 im s11111111a i11i11n,1 est''; De r:/Jiai"., 1.10.33) in order to 
insist, "therefore equity [epieikeia, Greek; aeq11itas, Latin] is necessary."59 But such 
an exploration must wait for another occasion to appraise I .uther's love affair 
with this "wisest man." 
